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Abstract Philosophical semantics requires an ontology
that includes negative as well as positive states of affairs as
truth-makers and truth-breakers. Theories that try to do
without negative states of affairs while interpreting prop-
ositional truth as positive correspondence with existent
states of affairs are inherently inadequate and incomplete.
A semantics and ontology of negative states of affairs can
also do justice to positive states of affairs, since the iterated
negative state of affairs that a negative state of affairs
exists describes a positive state of affairs, but the iterated
positive state of affairs that a positive state of affairs exists
never describes a negative state of affairs. Negative states
of affairs are not only essential to semantics, but to a
complete description of the world; they include phenomena
of presence in absence and the metaphysics of gaps, lacks,
holes and interstitia. The conceivability of an empty or null
universe as consisting of nothing but negative states of
affairs recalls a famous problem of Parmenides.
Keywords Parmenides  Positive, negative states
of affairs  Semantics  Truth-breaker  Truth-maker
1 Truth and its Makers
A main task of philosophical semantics is to account for the
truth-values of true or false sentences. The truth or false-
hood of a sentence is determined by its truth conditions,
which are standardly said to depend at some depth of
semantic analysis on the existence of the facts or states
of affairs the sentence expresses. The truth of an affir-
mative proposition is established by the corresponding
state of affairs the proposition represents, and that is
accordingly said to be the proposition’s truth-maker.
Thus, the sentence, ‘The watch is on the table’, is made
true by the state of affairs in which the watch is in fact
on the table.
Philosophers as diverse in other aspects of their
thinking as Aristotle, Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell,
G. E. Moore, Carl Stumpf, Edmund Husserl, Ludwig
Wittgenstein, Alfred Tarski, Rudolf Carnap, Roderick
M. Chisholm, Donald Davidson, Robert Stalnaker, David
Lewis, and David Armstrong, to name but a few promi-
nent examples, have adopted an ontology of existent
states of affairs as truth conditions for the semantics of
propositional meaning, and, in particular, as the truth-
makers of true sentences, statements, or propositions. The
meaning of a sentence for these theorists is related in
different ways to its truth conditions, which are generally
understood as positive correlations with existent facts or
states of affairs.1
The falsehood of an affirmative proposition, on the other
hand, or, equivalently, the truth of its negation, is another
matter. Truth-maker theories, for a variety of interesting
reasons, as a rule have not taken sufficient notice of the
problems connected with what in parallel fashion might be
called truth-breakers as ontic conditions of a sentence’s
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falsehood, or, equivalently, again, as the truth-makers of its
negation.2 What makes it false that ‘The watch is on the
table’, when as a matter of fact the watch is not on the
table? What makes it true that ‘It is not the case that the
watch is on the table’ or that ‘The watch is not on the
table’? How much work can we expect a standard truth-
maker semantics to do? Can it handle the workload, or
must it be supplemented by additions to or refinements of
stock truth-maker theories?
There seems to be a widespread but largely unspoken,
unexamined and unargued assumption that if we take care
of the truth conditions of true sentences, then we will have
automatically taken care of the falsity conditions of false
sentences. The negation of a false sentence, after all, is
(classically anyway) a true sentence. If we have in hand a
correct grasp of general semantic truth conditions for true
sentences, then what difference does it make whether the
sentences in question are logically or grammatically affir-
mations or negations? Although this seems a reasonable
stance to adopt in developing a minimalist approach to
truth-value analysis, we shall see that things are not so
straightforward in understanding the logic, semantics, and
metaphysics of falsehood and negation as mere extensions
of those deemed adequate for truth and affirmation. We can
begin to raise difficulties for an ontology and semantics of
truth-breakers by asking what makes it false that the watch
is on the table, if in fact the watch is not on the table. Is it a
particular state of affairs or any of a range of states of
affairs excluding those in which the watch is on the table?
Or, if we are ideologically prepared to countenance nega-
tive states of affairs, might we say instead that what makes
the sentence false when it is false is the lack, nonoccur-
rence, nonexistence, or failure to obtain of a particular state
of affairs? What are the possibilities, and what are the
advantages and disadvantages of these alternatives in
working out a semantics of false predication?
In what follows, I explore the limitations of positive
states of affairs as truth-breakers for false sentences. If the
argument is correct, then negative states of affairs in the
above sense are indispensable to the metaphysics of a
correct philosophical semantics. To the extent that received
theories of truth-makers rely exclusively on the existence
of positive states of affairs as a reflection of the desire to
scale down ontic commitments in accord with the principle
of ontological parsimony, the demonstrated need for at
least some negative states of affairs supports the inclusion
of negative as well as positive states of affairs. Accord-
ingly, I briefly sketch and develop some parts of a hybrid
theory of positive and negative states of affairs as truth-
makers and truth-breakers.
2 States of Affairs, Positive and Negative
We are naturally inclined, some would say overwhelmingly
compelled, to think of ontology and philosophical seman-
tics in positive terms. The world by reference to which the
meaning and truth of many and arguably the most impor-
tant episodes of thought and their expression in language
are determined is something extant. It is the existent world
that gives us something to talk about, and there could
hardly be language users or concrete language tokens were
it not for the positive states of affairs that constitute the
actual world. The emphasis on positive states of affairs, on
facts or moments that exist, occur, or obtain, on what is
present or manifest rather than what is absent or fails to
exist, is understandable if not inevitable or ultimately jus-
tifiable. Unsurprisingly, standard issue extensionalist
ontology and semantics focus exclusively on positive states
of affairs as truth-makers for true sentences.
Let us proceed by defining and distinguishing more
precisely the ontic categories of positive and negative
states of affairs.
A state of affairs, generally, is either positive or
negative.
A positive state of affairs is an object’s possession of a
property, or its participation in a relation. (Example: The
sky’s being blue; the watch’s being on the table.)
A negative state of affairs is the failure of an object to
possess a property, or its nonparticipation in a relation.
(Example: The sky’s not being blue; the watch’s not
being on the table.)
The existence of a negative state of affairs is the same
thing as the nonexistence of a corresponding positive state
of affairs. A semantic theory that attempts to account for
the truth-values of certain sentences by referring ostensibly
to the existence or nonexistence of positive states of affairs
only on the above definition is, perhaps despite itself,
committed to an interface of ontology and semantics that
includes at least some negative states of affairs. We can
therefore think of a false sentence’s truth-breaker as the
truth-maker of its negation.
One method of criticizing a truth-maker theory in light
of these considerations is to compare the prospects and
limitations of a general ontic-semantic theory schema that
2 The trend is evident in Kevin Mulligan, Peter Simons and Barry
Smith, ‘Truth-Makers’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,
44, 1984, pp. 287–321, where no provision for false sentences or the
truth-breakers of false sentences is made. Notable exceptions include
Bertrand Russell’s 1917–1918 ‘Lectures on Logical Atomism’,
published as The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, edited by David
Pears (LaSalle: Open Court Publishing, 1985), especially pp. 74–79.
Russell, however, p. 79, declines in discussion at the lectures to offer
a definition of ‘negative facts’, on the grounds that ‘negativeness is an
ultimate’. See also Richard Gale, Negation and Non-Being, American
Philosophical Quarterly Monographs, 10, 1976.
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invokes positive states of affairs only as both truth-makers
and truth-breakers with those of rival theories that coun-
tenance negative states of affairs. The following array
covers all possible combinations. We can have true or false
affirmative or negative sentences. We must therefore ask
whether and how an ontic-semantic theory limited exclu-
sively to positive states of affairs can provide the needed
truth-makers and truth-breakers for each of these four
semantic categories.
Theory 1: Positive States of Affairs as Truth-Makers and
Truth-Breakers.
1. Positive state of affairs as truth-maker for true
affirmative sentence: The sentence, ‘The watch is on
the table’, is made true if and only if the positive state
of affairs in which the watch is on the table exists.
2. Positive state of affairs as truth-breaker for false
negative sentence: The sentence, ‘The watch is not on
the table’ (‘It is not the case that the watch is on the
table’), is made false if and only if the positive state of
affairs in which the watch is on the table exists.
3. Positive state of affairs as truth-breaker for false
affirmative sentence: The sentence, ‘The watch is on
the table’, is made false if and only if the positive state of
affairs in which ________________________ exists.
4. Positive state of affairs as truth-maker for true negative
sentence: The sentence, ‘The watch is not on the table’
(‘It is not the case that the watch is on the table’), is
made true if and only if the positive state of affairs in
which ________________________ exists.
The challenge here is to fill in the blanks in schemata (3)
and (4) with the description of a purely positive state of
affairs that serves as a truth-breaker for the sentence, ‘The
watch is on the table’, when in fact there is no watch on the
table, and as a truth-maker for the true negative sentence,
‘The watch is not on the table’ (‘It is not the case that the
watch is on the table’), when again there is in fact no watch
on the table. What sorts of solutions might be proposed?
We might first attempt to describe the state of affairs in
which the table contains other things, none of which is a
watch, or in which the table top is completely described
without mention of a watch, adding that what has been
positively described (sans watch) is the totality of objects
on the table. Wittgenstein gets away with something like
this reduction of negative to positive states of affairs in the
Tractatus, but only with respect to the existence or non-
existence of specifically atomic or logically simplest facts
(Sachverhalte, in the technical sense of the term Wittgen-
stein develops there) composing the basic structure in
logical space for the more complex facts recognized by
common sense and rigorous science. Any one of the
Tractatus atomic facts can either be the case or not be the
case, he maintains, while everything else remains the same.3
In contrast, we are speaking here about the semantic role of
complex facts as truth-makers or truth-breakers, where the
situation is very different. It is true that the above-mentioned
ways of characterizing the watch-less table top explicitly
refer to negative states of affairs—‘none of which is a
watch’; ‘without mention of a watch’; ‘sans watch’. These
are formulated, however, so to speak, only meta-semanti-
cally. As such, they need not be included in the descriptions
of states of affairs themselves concerning the watch-less
or sans-watch table top by which we try to complete the
schemata blanks with descriptions of purely positive
states of affairs that characterize the table as deprived of
watches.
Suppose we describe the table top in purely positive
terms, in which no watches are mentioned, and we add that,
concerning whatever objects if any are on the table, perhaps
a teacup and paperweight, that these are the totality or all and
only the objects located there. Can such a description of
purely positive states of affairs constitute a truth-breaker for
the sentence, ‘The watch is on the table’, when in fact there is
no watch on the table? Can it constitute a truth-maker for the
sentence, ‘The watch is not on the table’, when in fact there
is no watch on the table? There would appear to be only two
possibilities, neither of which provides an adequate truth-
breaker for the false affirmative sentence or truth-maker for
the true negative sentence. What we need is to be able to
derive whatever is minimally required, logically or ex-
tralogically, from the complete description of the table top
offered exclusively in terms of positive states of affairs as
(meta-semantically) containing no watches in order to
make false the false affirmative sentence, ‘The watch is
on the table’, and to make true under the same circum-
stances the true negative sentence, ‘The watch is not on
the table’.
The first possibility is that the complete description of the
watch-less table top logically implies that it is false that ‘The
watch is on the table’ and true that ‘The watch is not on
the table’. The proposal requires that what is made true by
the positive states of affairs that exist also determine what is
thereby made false. Again, this works for Wittgenstein’s
atomic facts and the elementary propositions by which
they are expressed, but not for complex facts belonging to
complex supervenience nets of ontic dependence. We need
3 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, edited by
CK. Ogden (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1922), ‘1.11 The
world is determined by the facts, and by these being all the facts. 1.12
For the totality of facts determines both what is the case, and also all
that is not the case. 2.04 The totality of existent atomic facts is the
world. 2.05 The totality of existent atomic facts also determines
which atomic facts do not exist. 2.06 The existence and non-existence
of atomic facts is the reality. (The existence of atomic facts we also
call a positive fact, their non-existence a negative fact.)’
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under this first stratagem to be able validly to infer that it is
not the case that the watch is on the table from the
description of whatever is on the table together with the fact
that this is the totality of or that these are all and only the
things on the table. Can this be done entirely without ref-
erence to any negative states of affairs? There are two
obstacles. The reasoning is formally invalid, unless we
include the fact that any of the objects mentioned as being on
the table top is not a watch, thus bringing another negative
fact into the inference. The logic has this form:
1. The teacup is on the table.
2. The paperweight is on the table.
3. The teacup and the paperweight are the only things on
the table.
________________________
4. It is false that the watch is on the table.
A second problem is that despite superficial appear-
ances, proposition (3) describes a negative state of affairs.
For it is logically equivalent to the explicitly negative
existential: ‘There is nothing on the table other than the
teacup and the paperweight’. This, we might say, is its
meaning, without which the effect of providing the nec-
essary truth-breaker or truth-maker is not assured. The
sentence in (3) as a result requires a negative state of affairs
as its truth-maker after all; it does not in that case meet its
logical-semantic explanatory burden by appealing exclu-
sively to purely positive states of affairs.
We may be more accustomed to thinking of totality, of
all and only, as a positive state of affairs. As reflection
shows, the question is more complicated. The standard
formulations by which totalities are described are at least
superficially grammatically affirmative rather than nega-
tive. Thus, we say, after listing the items located on a
table top, that these are all of the objects situated there,
that this is the total inventory. If the list contains only the
items ‘teacup’ (c) and ‘paperweight’ (p), then we can say
of things on (O) the tabletop (t) minus the watch (w),
that:
O t; cð Þ ^ O t; pð Þ ^ 8x½O t; xð Þ ! ½x ¼ c _ x ¼ p ð1Þ
The universal clause expresses the fact that the totality
of objects on the table top is limited to the teacup and
paperweight; thus, in effect, excluding the watch. True
enough, there is no explicit use of negation in proposition
(1). Shall we then be satisfied with (1) as an interpretation
involving no negative or nonexistent positive states of
affairs?
The answer seems to be no. The conclusion is not log-
ically guaranteed unless or until we specify that the watch
is not identical to the teacup, or to the paperweight or table
top. We must, then, if we are being perspicuous about the
totality of objects on the table, include the following
clause describing an ostensibly negative state of affairs,
whereby:
8x½½½x¼ c! x 6¼w ^ ½x¼ p! x 6¼w ^ ½x¼ t! x 6¼w
ð2Þ
Alternatively, with less fuss, we can also write:
c 6¼ w ^ p 6¼ w ^ t 6¼ w ð3Þ
These nonidentities are explicitly negative, and as such,
in lieu of an adequate philosophical semantics limited
exclusively to the existence of positive states of affairs, they
presumably correspond to negative states of affairs as their
truth-makers. By ‘presumably’ here I mean that at this point
we have not yet found a clearcut way of eliminating them, as
we might at first have hoped. We can simplify the conditions
by avoiding the need to distinguish the table top from the
watch if we maintain that nothing is on top of itself, by
means of the general principle, 8x½:O x; xð Þor 8x8y
½½O x; yð Þ _ O y; xð Þ ! x 6¼ y. This condition explicitly
introduces yet another negation presumably corresponding
to yet another negative state of affairs as its truth-maker. The
combined effect of these conditions is to alter the original
affirmative totality statement to an expression containing
several patently negative assertions, with something like the
form:
O t; cð Þ ^ O t; pð Þ ^ 8x½O t; xð Þ ! ½x ¼ c _ x ¼ p
^ c 6¼ w ^ p 6¼ w ^ 8x½:O x; xð Þ ð4Þ
The requirement so explicated makes it clear that the
totality principle, while superficially positive, harbors
hidden ineliminable negations for which negative states
of affairs remain the best candidates as presumptive truth-
makers. Although to say that a list contains the totality of
items belonging to a certain category appears at first to
be a positive state of affairs, what it means on reflection
to say that a given specification of entities is the totality
of such things is that all other things are excluded, which
in the above sense is again presumably made true only by
a negative state of affairs, in that anything else is not to
be considered as belonging to the specified totality. To
assert that X, Y, and Z are the totality of things
belonging to category C is always to say that nothing else
belongs to C, and this is unmistakably to say something
negative.
Another damaging objection to this first method of trying
to acknowledge positive states of affairs as the only category
of truth-makers and truth-breakers for true or false affir-
mative or negative sentences is that thus far at least there is
no conceptual bridge to carry the inference from the
assumptions to the conclusion. Logic by itself, considered
only in and of itself, knows nothing of tables and watches,
teacups or paperweights. As far as pure logic is concerned,
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all tables might already or analytically come equipped with
watches on them, as part of the concept of a table, or of what
it means for something to be a table, in roughly the same way
that a table necessarily possesses at least one leg, a bachelor
is necessarily an unmarried male adult, or something colored
is necessarily extended. Nor does logic by itself rule out the
possibility that ‘teacup’ or ‘paperweight’ might not be just
another word for ‘watch’, in the way that (with appropriate
qualifications) ‘pocket or wrist clock’ or ‘timepiece’ can
refer to the same object. We cannot expect the assumptions in
(1–3) of the inference above validly to imply the conclusion
in (4), with or without the requirement for a negative state of
affairs to provide the implicit truth-maker for assumption (3).
It is an invalid inference independently of the need for a
negative state of affairs, unless we add the bridge principle
according to which, in effect, ‘A table does not analytically
come equipped with a watch’, and ‘The words ‘‘teacup’’ and
‘‘paperweight’’ are not synonyms for ‘‘watch’’, nor does their
existence imply or entail the existence of a watch’, both of
which take us back immediately to the problem of positing a
negative state of affairs as truth-maker.
The failure of the bridge principle needed to validate the
logical entailment of the truth-breaker for the sentence ‘The
watch is on the table’, when in fact there is no watch on the
table, also exposes the limitations of a second, extralogical,
method of interpreting purely positive states of affairs as
truth-breakers of false affirmative sentences and truth-
makers of true negative sentences. The suggestion is that we
establish a conceptual link between the condition of the table
top when it (meta-semantically speaking) lacks the presence
of a watch, in positive terms only of the things it does con-
tain, such that it follows as a truth-breaker by which the
sentence, ‘The watch is on the table’ is made false, and as a
truth-maker for the negative sentence, ‘The watch is not on
the table’. The difficulty encountered in the extralogical
proposal is precisely the same as that involved in the second
strategy for making the purely logical implication proposal
work. We should recognize that in order to construe the
positive states of affairs that constitute the watch-less table
top as a truth-breaker for the sentence, ‘The watch is on the
table’, when in fact the sentence is false (or as a truth-maker
for the negative sentence, ‘The watch is not on the table’),
we need to appeal to extralogical principles concerning the
fact that there are no other objects on the table, that ‘watch’
is not another word for a teacup or paperweight, that tables
do not analytically come equipped with watches, or the like.
The problem as before is that all such information must
apparently be conveyed by sentences whose truth-makers
apparently can only be negative states of affairs.
Where affirmative sentences alone are concerned, we do
not need and cannot plausibly invoke negative states of
affairs as truth-makers. The semantic requirements of truth-
breakers for affirmative sentences, however, are another
story. There, it seems, we have no choice but to admit
negative states of affairs alongside positive states of affairs.
3 Negative States of Affairs as Truth-Makers
and Truth-Breakers
We should accordingly consider the principles of an ontic-
semantic theory that incorporates negative states of affairs
as truth-makers and truth-breakers.
Theory 2: Hybrid Positive–Negative States of Affairs as
Truth-Makers and Truth-Breakers.
1. Positive state of affairs as truth-maker for true
affirmative sentence: The sentence, ‘The watch is on
the table’, is made true if and only if the positive state
of affairs in which the watch is on the table exists.
2. Positive state of affairs as truth-breaker for false
negative sentence: The sentence, ‘The watch is not on
the table’ (‘It is not the case that the watch is on the
table’), is made false if and only if the positive state of
affairs in which the watch is on the table exists.
3. Negative state of affairs as truth-breaker for false
affirmative sentence: The sentence, ‘The watch is on
the table’, is made false if and only if the negative state
of affairs in which it is not the case that the watch is on
the table exists.
4. Negative state of affairs as truth-maker for true negative
sentence: The sentence, ‘The watch is not on the table’, is
made true if and only if the negative state of affairs in
which it is not the case that the watch is on the table exists.
An ontology that includes negative states of affairs pro-
vides a straightforward semantic analysis of propositional
negation. The truth conditions for a proposition, a declara-
tive true or false sentence, establish a correspondence
between the sentence and a state of affairs, positive or
negative, that makes the sentence true or that makes it false.
Semantics considered formally is a matter of abstract map-
ping relations relating language and the world, names and a
domain of objects, or the like. Negation is a relative concept,
since we can equally say that ‘The watch is on the table’ is
the negation of ‘The watch is not on the table’, just as we can
say that ‘The watch is not on the table’ is the negation of
‘The watch is on the table’. Each is the negation of the other,
indicating that negation, unsurprisingly, is nothing positive
in itself. We can formalize the ontic-semantic principles that
we have informally defended in these terms:
8x; p½½Truth-maker x; pð Þ _ Truth-breaker x; pð Þ ! E!x
ðP1Þ
We require, as previously informally explained, that a
state of affairs, positive or negative, must exist in order to
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be a truth-maker or truth-breaker of any proposition,
atomic or compound.
8x; p½Truth-maker x; pð Þ $ Truth-breakerðx;:pÞ ðP2Þ
The principle stipulates that a state of affairs is a truth-
maker for a given affirmative sentence if and only if the
same state of affairs is a truth-breaker for the sentence’s
negation. It follows by uniform substitution that a state of
affairs is a truth-maker for a given negative sentence if and
only if it is also the truth-breaker for the corresponding
affirmative sentence:
8x; p½Truth-makerðx;:pÞ $ Truth-breaker x; pð Þ ðP3Þ
An implication of (P2) and (P3), in accord with the
proposed analysis of truth, falsehood, affirmation, negation,
and positive and negative states of affairs as truth-makers
and truth-breakers, is that there is no simple correlation
between negation and truth-breakers. The same positive or
negative state of affairs can alternatively be a truth-maker or
truth-breaker, depending on the nature of the case and the
prevailing truth-making or truth-breaking circumstances in
the world. If a positive state of affairs is the truth-maker for a
given affirmative sentence, however, then it is certain that
the sentence’s truth-breaker, and the truth-maker of its
negation, will be a negative state of affairs.4
We further observe that if the truth-maker of a sentence is
a positive state of affairs, then the sentence’s truth-breaker
will be the corresponding negative state of affairs. The latter
can also be characterized as the negation of a description of
the corresponding positive state of affairs, and hence of
whatever predication of property or relations to an object or
ordered set of objects constitutes the relevant positive state
of affairs. For simplicity and merely heuristically, we con-
sider all relations reductively as relational qualities. Thus,
the relation Rab via lamba abstraction becomes alternatively
(and indifferently) the unary predication kx[Rxb]a or
kx[Rax]b. For any proposition p, we represent the state of
affairs such that p by enclosing ‘p’ within wedge brackets, as
\p[. More formally, then, we can say:
8x; y; p½½Truth-maker x; pð Þ ^ x ¼ \/a[ 
$ ½Truth-breaker y; pð Þ $ y ¼ \:/a[  ðP4Þ
Here the clear implication is that negative states of affairs,
as truth-makers or truth-breakers, do not informatively
explicate but rather presuppose the concept of negation.
Such a result is preapparent in the phrase, ‘negative state of
affairs’. It is nevertheless well worth emphasizing the fact
because there is a strong temptation to consider the ontic
status of truth-breakers as something grounding the concept
of negation. An adequate ontic-semantic theory of truth
conditions for affirmative and negative sentences as a result
must acknowledge the complementary existence of positive
states of affairs as truth-makers for affirmative predications,
and of truth-breaking negative states of affairs as the
nonexistence of corresponding truth-makers. The nonex-
istence of a state of affairs as a negative state of affairs once
again presupposes rather than helps to explicate the concept
of negation, which in semantics as in propositional logic
appears to be a primitive logical relation.
8x; y; p½½Truth-maker x; pð Þ ^ x ¼ \E!a[ 
$ ½Truth-breaker y; pð Þ $ y ¼ \:E!a[  ðP5Þ
The same is even more obviously true in the purely
propositional counterpart of (P5), in which the existence or
nonexistence of a truth-making or truth-breaking state of
affairs is written finally in simplest form, where ‘p’ is an
affirmative sentence such as an atomic wff (well-formed
formula):
8x; p½½Truth-maker x; pð Þ ! E!x ^ ½Truth-breaker x; pð Þ
! :E!x ðP6Þ
What if we try to say that a sentence is true iff it has a
truth-maker, and is otherwise false? The lack of a
4 Purely for theoretical interest, it is worth noting that it is possible to
advance a reductive account of truth-makers and truth-breakers for
true and false affirmative and negative sentences. Whereas we cannot
get by exclusively with positive states of affairs as truth-makers and
truth-breakers, we can contrariwise meet the semantic obligations in
question with only negative states of affairs. The reason for the
asymmetry is clear when we reflect informally that two positives do
not make a negative, but two negatives make a positive.
Theory 3 (Reduction):
Negative States of Affairs as Truth-Makers and Truth-Breakers
1. Negative state of affairs as truth-maker for true affirmative
sentence: The sentence, ‘The watch is on the table’, is made true
if and only if the negative state of affairs in which it is not the
case that the watch is on the table fails to exist.
2. Negative state of affairs as truth-breaker for false negative
sentence: The sentence, ‘The watch is not on the table’, is made
false if and only if the negative state of affairs in which it is not
the case that the watch is on the table exists.
3. Negative state of affairs as truth-breaker for false affirmative
sentence: The sentence, ‘The watch is on the table’, is made false
if and only if the negative state of affairs in which it is not the
case that the watch is on the table exists.
4. Negative state of affairs as truth-maker for true negative
sentence: The sentence, ‘The watch is not on the table’, is made
true if and only if the negative state of affairs in which it is not
the case that the watch is on the table exists.
The distinction is manifest among other ways in symbolic logic by
the fact that all of the five standard propositional connectives can be
reduced to any of the remaining three plus negation, even if combined
in a single operator like the Sheffer stroke or Nicod dagger function,
but that without negation, or at least predicate complementarity in the
Footnote 4 continued




truth-maker makes the sentence false and is therefore
constitutes its truth-breaker. This is correct as far as it goes,
but it implies that in such a situation the sentence has no
truth-maker, that the sentence’s positive fact truth-maker
fails to exist, where the truth-maker’s nonexistence is once
again a negative state of affairs as truth-maker.
Note that in (P6) we do not deny that a truth-breaker is
an existent state of affairs. Rather, the principle asserts
conditionally that if a certain state of affairs is a truth-
maker for a given atomic proposition, then there exists no
truth-breaker for the same atomic proposition. According
to the present proposal, both truth-makers and truth-
breakers are existent positive or negative states of affairs,
but there exists no state of affairs that is both a truth-maker
and truth-breaker for the same proposition. Intuitively, we
know:
8p½E!\:p [ $ :E!\p [ 
The notation thereby encourages us to speak of the
existence even of states of affairs in which another state of
affairs does not exist, when the nonexistence of a certain
state of affairs itself exists as a truth-breaker for a given
(atomic) proposition, as E!\:E!a[ . Further elaborations
of the theory are possible, in which we stipulate for
example that from :E!\:E!a[ we rightly infer that
\:E!a[ can be a truth-maker or truth-breaker for any
wff—even when a considered in itself provides either (but
not both) a truth-maker or truth-breaker (not both) for a
certain proposition. By contrast, from :E!a we rightly infer
that a cannot be either a truth-maker or truth-breaker for
any wff, whereas :E!a under the same circumstances
might be a truth-maker or a truth-breaker (but not both) for
some proposition, provided that E!\:E!a[ . Iterations of
existence assertions or denials for states of affairs as
opposed to immediate reference to the corresponding states
of affairs themselves are possible, but would appear to
belong exclusively to the realm of ingenious philosophical
thought experiments rather than to the minimally essential
semantic requirements of truth-makers and truth-breakers
in ordinary, including very complicated, but in this sense
extra-philosophical, applications. Such iterations in any
case do not threaten the semantic principles for truth-
makers and truth-breakers of true or false affirmative and
negative sentences.
The use of truth tables as matrices of truth-values ‘T’
and ‘F’ in the definition of propositional connectives
including negation can now be explained. The ontic status
of truth-values has frequently been left mysterious, or, as in
Frege, arbitrarily assigned to abstract objects, ‘the True’
and ‘the False’. This is clearly an undesirable lacuna and
makeshift in the formal semantics of propositional logic.
The proposed ontic-semantic framework of positive and
negative states of affairs now permits us to interpret
truth-values as representing the existence or nonexistence of
corresponding truth-makers, which is to say, where atomic
wffs are arrayed in the leftmost columns of a standard truth
table, of positive states of affairs as truth-makers and neg-
ative states of affairs as truth-breakers, through which the
truth-functional meanings of more complex wffs are deter-
mined. To write ‘T’ below or beside a propositional symbol
in a truth table can be understood in effect as indicating the
existence of a corresponding positive state of affairs as truth-
maker, or, equivalently, the nonexistence of a corresponding
truth-breaking negative state of affairs. At the same time,
writing ‘F’ indicates the nonexistence of a corresponding
positive state of affairs as truth-maker, or equivalently the
existence of a corresponding truth-breaking negative state of
affairs. Since propositional symbols are always syntactically
atomic, their truth-makers on the present account are nec-
essarily positive states of affairs, and their truth-breakers, or
the truth-makers of their negations, are necessarily negative
states of affairs. A complete standard truth table is then a
definition by cases of the truth conditions for the formally
characterized wffs in a propositional logic. The truth con-
ditions it displays represent the existence of truth-makers
and truth-breakers for component atomic wffs or proposi-
tional symbols, which are, respectively, positive and nega-
tive states of affairs, codified in ontic-semantic principles
(P1–P6).
We should accordingly disillusion ourselves, when we
write out a bivalent truth table definition for propositional
negation, that we are informatively defining the concept of
negation, as though out of whole cloth. The truth table for
negation does not define the concept of negation, as we
may like to tell beginning symbolic logic students, but at
most articulates one interpretation of a negation sign in a
formalized bivalent propositional logic. For an array of
truth-values informatively to define the concept of nega-
tion, it would need to introduce the concept for the first
time, from the ground up. We have now seen that this
cannot be the case in the standard truth table definition of
negation. The meaning of the ‘T’s’ and ‘F’s’ in terms of
which the negation sign is defined instead presuppose the
concept of negation. Where, simply put, ‘T’ represents the
existence of a propositional symbol’s truth-maker, and ‘F’
represents the existence of its corresponding truth-breaker,
the nonexistence of its truth-maker, it follows that truth-
makers are distinguished from truth-breakers meta-
semantically, as explicated in (P1–P6), on the present
interpretation, by means of a prior concept of negation that
is already present and operative in, rather than defined from
scratch by the meaningfulness of, a truth table definition of
the negation sign.5
5 The same conclusion obviously holds with respect to nonclassical
gap and higher-valued truth tables that transcend bivalence.
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4 Presence in Absence
The appeal to negative states of affairs is not merely
ontically convenient, but indispensable for many purposes
in philosophical semantics. Now that we have examined
reasons for including negative states of affairs as truth-
makers and truth-breakers in formal semantics, we turn to
philosophical considerations about negative states of
affairs in metaphysics and everyday reasoning.
What makes negative facts essential is the occurrence of
something real albeit nonexistent that must be designated
and described in order adequately to account for the state of
the world. There is often something substantive about
negative states of affairs. There seem to be truths about the
world that can only be understood as something negative,
something that is not there, missing, or absent, but that
nevertheless possess a kind of presence in absence—as
Jean-Paul Sartre in Being and Nothingness maintains of his
normally punctual friend Pierre when he fails to appear as
promised at the cafe´ at the appointed hour. It is negative
facts such as these, like the watch not being on the table,
that cannot be conveyed exclusively in terms of existent
positive states of affairs.6
Consider as examples a non-reply to a letter. A col-
league always answers mail in a short period of time until
one sends a note critical of a book or article the person has
recently published. One calls up one’s e-mail or looks in
the letter bin for days and weeks or even longer. The
missing reply, the fact that no answer has been given, has a
significance that cannot be adequately understood in posi-
tive terms of the correspondence one has received from
which the colleague’s communications are missing, toge-
ther with any other ensemble of positive facts. Perhaps the
colleague is miffed and is deliberately choosing not to
respond to indicate displeasure. If so, then the negative
state of affairs of the nonreply or failure of the colleague to
reply is in its own way potentially even more eloquent than
if the person had sent back an angry response or offered a
conspicuous snub at a conference or social occasion as a
clearcut positive state of affairs. The fact that we expect a
reply and do not receive one under the circumstances
makes its non-receipt as real a part of the world as a nasty
rejoinder; yet it has its own special character, an aura of
ambiguity inspiring doubt, and of causing one to worry and
think about the effect of one’s actions that may have
occasioned the failure to respond. It is a negative state of
affairs that is as real to a complete description of the sit-
uation as any relevant positive fact of the matter.
Once we become sensitized to the importance of nega-
tive states of affairs we may begin to see their presence in
absence in many different contexts. Every year we spend
the holidays with relatives sitting around the table where
grandpa tells stories about his wild oats days in Mont-
martre, until one year he passes away and things are pat-
ently no longer the same. We gather at table and there
conspicuously is grandpa’s empty chair. We can almost
hear him starting up one of his implausible tales and
making jokes, being the life of the party. He is gone, and
the negative state of affairs of his not being there is as
palpably real a fact about the family dynamic as any of the
positive states of affairs that happen to obtain. Nor can we
account for his absence and the difference his absence
makes by specifying that he was there the previous year
and said this and that, and that this year the company
consisted of other persons who had this and that to eat and
this and that to say. There is something more to grandpa’s
not being there. His not being there is a fact about the get
together that makes it different; his absence gives the
occasion a particular flavor and character of something
being missing that is not adequately captured merely in the
positive terms of a description of who is there and what
they do.
We can say much the same about many situations in
which there seems to be a definite identifiable presence of
something by virtue of its absence, of the negative fact or
state of affairs of its not being there. It is like an afterimage,
in which the surroundings take on a different significance
because of what has been subtracted. The nonoccurrence of
fossils on Mars, if there happen to be no preserved plant or
animal remains on its surface, a negative fact, is as much an
important scientific discovery for remote explorers of the red
planet as the positive finding of fossils would be, because of
its value in helping to settle an outstanding question
of extraterrestrial biology. The nonexistence of a proof or
disproof of a mathematical theorem carries a similar kind of
weight in the formal disciplines, especially with theorists
and practitioners of an intuitionistic inclination. To give
only a brief indication of some of the unlimitedly many
further possibilities, we might think of the amputation of a
limb and its separation from the body, independently of
phantom limb experience, the removal of a cast from a
broken arm, the sudden failure of the brakes on a speeding
6 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenome-
nological Ontology, translated and with an introduction by Hazel
Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), p. 9: ‘But if we
wish to decide with certainty, we need only to consider an example of
a negative judgment and to ask ourselves whether it causes non-being
to appear at the heart of being or merely limits itself to determining a
prior revelation. I have an appointment with Pierre at four o’clock. I
arrive at the cafe´ a quarter of an hour late. Pierre is always punctual.
Will he have waited for me? I look at the room, the patrons, and I say,
‘‘He is not here.’’ Is there an intuition of Pierre’s absence, or does
negation indeed enter in only with judgment? At first it seems absurd
to speak of intuition since to be exact there could not be an intuition
of nothing and since the absence of Pierre is this nothing. Popular
consciousness, however, bears witness to this intuition. Do we not
say, for example, ‘‘I suddenly saw that he was not there.’’ Is this just a
matter of misplacing the negation?’ See also pp. 9–16 and passim.
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automobile, the departure of a troublesome co-worker, the
loss of a loved one, the unexplained nonattendance of a
scheduled speaker, the extraction of a tooth and its lack of
contribution to a person’s smile, and so on indefinitely.
A recent noteworthy and highly poignant example is the
empty space in New York City where the twin towers of
the World Trade Center stood before the terrorist attack of
11 September 2001. There, significantly, to commemorate
the tragedy, a powerful set of vertically reaching light-
beams for some months afterward were used to outline the
place that the buildings used to occupy. The fact, also, that
many persons touched by the incident have thought it
would be a more fitting tribute to the victims who lost their
lives in the event never to build again a structure in the
same place to replace the original towers also testifies to
the meaning attached by some to the absence in that space
where the buildings had been, a poignant presence in
absence, and a negative state of affairs in which there
continue to be no buildings like the ones that were
destroyed.
If there are negative facts, then we may need to make
reference to them in order to offer adequate characteriza-
tions of the state of the world. In that case, ontology and
semantics must make provision for negative as well as
positive states of affairs. Despite, but often precisely
because of the fact that negative facts are states of affairs
that do not exist, they make a unique addition to our
understanding of the total condition of things, comple-
menting our understanding of what exists with the signif-
icance of what also does not exist.
5 Metaphysics of Holes and Interstitia
Are holes and interstitia as empty, open or unoccupied
spaces between existent things, themselves something
positive, or are they negative states of affairs? Is the
existence of a hole of whatever size or shape a fact or non-
fact? If we think that the existence and quality of a hole is a
positive state of affairs, then we must acknowledge that the
filling of a hole is something negative, the absence or
elimination of what had been a hole. This seems an odd,
unnatural, and even backwards way of understanding the
metaphysics of holes. Intuitively, it seems more plausible
to regard a hole as an absence of solid physical stuff
continuously surrounded by solid material substance, and
hence as a negative state of affairs.7
Holes and interstitia as we ordinarily think of them are
not altogether devoid of physical objects. An uncovered
manhole in the street over a conduit leading to a sewer, or a
mousehole chewed into the wainscoting, are good exam-
ples. The manhole and the mousehole within the Earth’s
atmosphere are filled from rim to rim with air molecules of
varying compositions. The difference between solid and
liquid or vaporous substance seems to be part of the
analysis of the concept of a hole. The same is true of a hole
in the ice within or beneath which the water of a lake or
river remains fluid. It is a hole because the ice surrounding
it is solid and the water filling the hole is not. A complete
theory of the concept of holes is not yet in our grasp,
because we have not settled on a set of intuitively satis-
factory sufficient conditions for holes. We see this when we
consider that a wine glass has a thin solid cylinder (or
polygon) of solid material surrounding its opening and
enclosing on the sides and bottom a generally nonsolid
substance like air if the glass is empty or a liquid if the
glass is in use. However, we would not ordinarily consider
the solidly enclosed opening of a wine glass, aquarium, or
the like, a receptacle to be filled, as a hole. A hole in such
containers, properly so-called, would produce a leak,
contrary to the vessel’s intended purpose.
Whatever else a hole might be, we shall focus for the
moment on what seems to be the necessary condition
whereby a hole is something empty of solid material sub-
stance or at least of the same kind of solid material sub-
stance by which the hole is said to be surrounded. If a hole
is essentially the absence of the same kind of (typically
solid) material by which it is circumscribed, then the
existence of a hole seems eminently to be a negative state
of affairs. A ‘hole’ is a name for something that is not
there, the absence of the same kind of thing, whatever it is,
that surrounds the hole. The hole is an interruption in what
would otherwise be the continuity of a material substance,
and is therefore rightly described as an absence or lack of
that otherwise uniform distribution of substance in a par-
ticular place. Some holes are natural, in which sense we
rightly speak of body orifices as holes; others are caused,
and are named either for their cause, as in the case of bullet
holes, or for that with which they are meant to be filled,
such as a buttonhole. Still other holes are named for the
thing in which the hole occurs, such as a doughnut hole, a
term also used popularly to refer to a nugget of dough
about the size that would need to be removed from the
center of a doughnut in order to create a round opening in a
solid piece of dough, if, counterfactually, that was how
doughnuts were made.
All holes and interstitia, properly so-called, are spaces
where the distribution of a certain material is naturally,
deliberately or accidentally missing or deleted. They are
spaces in between the occurrence of physical stuff that are
not filled with the same stuff, like a cavity in the enamel of
a tooth. Such characterizations of holes and interstitia
strongly suggest that their occurrences are negative states
7 See Roberto Casati and Achille C. Varzi, Holes and Other
Superficialities (Cambridge: The MIT Press (Bradford Books)).
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of affairs. They are what is not there in a certain place, in
contrast with that which surrounds the opening. It is this
sense of the word that seems to be relevant to metaphors
and similes involving holes, such as the concept of a black
hole in scientific cosmology. A black hole is not the
absence of stuff, but rather the highly concentrated
implosion of a star into a dwarf with a gravitational field so
powerful that all matter in the vicinity, including all pho-
tons in light rays, are drawn and irretrievably compacted
into its substance. A hole in the ground is ordinarily
something that smaller objects can fall into, in much the
same way that light rays literally fall into a black hole,
never to return to open space. A black hole as such is after
all a gap or lack or absence, despite being densely packed
with matter, something missing in the fabric of space,
namely, of light and the transmission of information by
lightwave propagation into the morass of an enormous
gravitational light sump.
If the existence of a hole or interstitium is literally a
negative fact, constituting a lack or absence or disconti-
nuity in the distribution of a certain material substance,
then holes and interstitia like other kinds of absences can
nevertheless be said to be something real, with a definite
presence in absence. A hole can cause events to happen
that would otherwise not occur. It can cause a toe to stick
out of a stocking, milk to drip out of a carton, a jogger to
fall and break an ankle, and many other things besides. A
hole for oxygen to enter a closed compartment can save a
life, while a hole in an aorta can kill. To say that there is a
hole is to call attention to what is not there, what is not the
case, even though grammatically we may speak of the
existence of a hole along with its qualities and relations, as
if it were something more positive. A hole can always be
filled with something existent, the existence of which is a
positive state of affairs, but the hole itself remains a neg-
ative fact, the absence of a certain kind of substance in a
certain place. The sentence, therefore, that ‘There is a hole
in the table’, according to the proposed ontic-semantic
analysis, requires a negative state of affairs as its truth-
maker, which also serves as the sentence’s truth-breaker
when in fact there is no hole.
6 Conceivability of a Null Universe
As a final application, we turn to the problems posed by
the conceivability of a totally null universe. It appears
intuitively possible for the universe to have contained
nothing positive whatsoever, no material objects or their
properties. If some form of radical nominalism turns out
to be true, then there will be no abstract objects or their
properties either, and hence no existent positive states of
affairs at all.
There are difficulties in trying to think of an empty
universe. If we imagine only a vast black space with no
light and no planets or stars, then we will still be thinking
of space, the existence of which might be regarded as
something positive. We will also be including in the mental
picture our own presence as thinkers ‘observing’ the
emptiness with no lightwaves and no eyeballs or brains to
process visual information, from a particular perspective
and from a particular location in space. This is clearly a
misleading way to try to conceive of a null universe, but,
like many high level abstractions in physics and meta-
physics, such as the occurrence of the Big Bang, relativity
and quantum phenomena in four dimensions, and the like,
it may be the best we can do as an intuitive aid to the
understanding that we should nevertheless recognize as
falling short of a proper representation. The idea that there
might have existed nothing and hence no objects with any
properties does not seem on first reflection to be logically
inconsistent or self-contradictory. As such, it passes one of
the frequently proposed tests for intelligibility as a logical
possibility. The question then is how we are to understand
the ontology and semantics of this (apparently) possibly
true sentence considered in the abstract of a universe that is
totally null and void.8
There may be more ingenious interpretations, but within
a hybrid framework that incorporates both positive and
negative states of affairs, it seems reasonable and arguably
most natural to describe the null universe as a logically
possible world in which the negative state of affairs exists
in or by virtue of which there are no existent positive states
of affairs. If we find it conceivable for the universe to be
altogether lacking in any positive states of affairs, with no
complex objects and hence no properties holding true of
objects, or if we consider the problem of why there is
something rather than nothing intelligible, regardless of
how the question is to be satisfactorily answered, then we
are presumably entertaining at least the logical possibility
of there existing a global universal negative state of affairs
in which there are no existent positive states of affairs. If
such a negative state of affairs were to exist, occur, or
obtain, then it would provide the negative factual truth-
maker for the sentence considered in the abstract or pro-
jected as a mere logical possibility, that ‘There is nothing
rather than something’, in the sense that there are supposed
to be no existent positive states of affairs. We cannot
accordingly dismiss such a possibility on purely logical
grounds simply by resuscitating a version of the
8 David Hume considers the inconceivability of a total vacuum in A
Treatise of Human Nature [1739–1740], edited by L.A. Selby-Bigge;
second edition by PH. Nidditch (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1978),
pp. 55–59; 223. The argument is discussed in Dale Jacquette, ‘‘Hume
on Infinite Divisibility and the Negative Idea of a Vacuum’’, The British
Journal for the History of Philosophy, 10, 2002, pp. 413–435.
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Parmenidean-Platonic argument that even in that case there
must exist the state of affairs by which there are no states
of affairs, once we distinguish as proposed between posi-
tive and negative states of affairs, and once we allow
negative states of affairs as truth-makers.9
If we are going to declare the impossibility of a null
universe within a framework of positive and negative states
of affairs, we can only do so through commitment to a
substantive ontic thesis whereby the existence of at least
some positive states of affairs is metaphysically guaranteed.
If such an ontology can be upheld, it will follow that the
negative state of affairs in which there are no existent posi-
tive states of affairs does not exist, occur, or obtain. Con-
sequently, taking negative states of affairs as truth-breakers
and sometime truth-makers into account, it is false that
‘Nothing exists’ and that ‘There exist no positive states of
affairs’. This will be so not merely as a result of the acci-
dental existence of positive states of affairs as truth-breakers,
but because of the doctrinally necessary existence of nega-
tive states of affairs as truth-breakers serving in this case to
falsify the proposition that there are at least some contin-
gently existent positive (physical) states of affairs.10,11
9 The so-called problem of being, of why there is something rather
than nothing, was posed first by G.W. Leibniz in his essay, ‘On the
Ultimate Origination of Things’ (1697), in Leibniz: Philosophical
Writings, edited by G.H.R. Parkinson, translated by Mary Morris and
Parkinson (London: J.M. Dent & Son, 1973), pp. 136–144. More
recently, the problem has been associated with the phenomenological
ontology of Martin Heidegger and his obsession with ‘the question of
being’. See Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics (Lectures
1953), translated by Ralph Manheim (New York: Doubleday, 1961),
pp. 1–42.
10 Plato’s Eleatic Stranger in his dialogue, the Sophist 237a-264b,
offers this paradox. See Montgomery Furth, ‘Elements of Eleatic
Ontology’, Journal of the History of Philosophy, 6, 1968, pp. 111–
132. Francis Jeffry Pelletier, Parmenides, Plato and the Semantics of
Non-Being (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990).
11 A version of this essay was presented at the Society for Exact
Philosophy, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada, 19–22 May
2005, under the title ‘Negative States of Affairs’ as an invited lecture
to the Vakgroep Theoretische Filosofie, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen,
The Netherlands, 2 November 2005, and in revised form as ‘Logic
and Semantics of False Predications’ at the Universita¨t Salzburg,
Austria, 18 May 2006. I recall with fondness the warm reception I
enjoyed at Salzburg from my friends and critics, Edgar Morscher,
Paul Weingartner, Alexander Heike, Arkadiusz Chrudzimski, and the
graduate students and other attendees of my Oberseminar with
Morscher on ‘Philosophische Logik’, 15–19 May 2006. Special
thanks are due to Theo A.F. Kuipers and Erik W. Krabbe for thought-
provoking comments at the Groningen colloquium. I am grateful to
the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in the Humanities and
Social Sciences (NIAS), Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and
Sciences (KNAW), for support of this and related topics in
philosophical logic and philosophy of mathematics during my visit
as Resident Research Fellow in 2005–2006. Later incarnations
appeared under the title ‘On the Logic of Negation’, Department of
Philosophy, University of Aberdeen, Scotland, 20 February 2007, and
‘Logic and Metaphysics of Negative States of Affairs’, presented to
the Department of Philosophy, Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey,
24 April 2007.
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